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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DIVORCE PROPERTY SETILEMENT AS

TAXABLE EVENT-Respondent taxpayer transferred stock to his former
wife pursuant to a voluntary property settlement agreement incorporated
in their divorce decree. As consideration for the securities conveyed, his
wife released her rights to alimony, dower, and intestate succession under
Delaware law.1 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed as taxable gain the difference between the taxpayer's basis for the stock and
its market value at the time of the transfer, but the Court of Claims ruled
that the taxpayer realized no taxable gain from the transfer.2 On certiorari,
held, reversed.3 The exchange was a taxable event in which the taxpayer
received property equivalent in value to the market worth of the securities
transferred. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
The transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a divorce property
settlement presents peculiar interpretative difficulties. Since the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 provides that appreciation in the value of property
shall be taxed only upon its "sale or other disposition," 4 the first question
presented in the principal case was whether the transfer of property incident to a settlement agreement constitutes such a "sale or other disposition"
and a consequent realization of economic gain or loss to the transferor
A

1 See DEL. CoDE .ANN. tit. 12, §§ 502, 901, 904, 905; tit. 13, § 1531 (1953); DEL. CoDE
ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1960).
2 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
3 The Court in the same opinion affirmed the holding of the Court of Claims that
the taxpayer's payment of his wife's legal expenses in connection with the tax aspects
of the divorce was not deductible under § 212(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Principal case at 74.
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
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within the meaning of section IOOI(a). 5 In such a property settlement the
wife ordinarily releases her inchoate alimony, dower, and succession rights
in return for an agreed consideration from the husband. 6 Assuming the
consideration to have a fixed value as agreed upon by the parties, the
husband receives the benefit of gain embodied in appreciated property, at
least within the technical requirements of the Code, when he uses it to
satisfy his settlement obligation, just as surely as if he sold that property
and used the sale proceeds to satisfy the agreed obligation.7 His wife,
however, is concerned only with the total value of the property transferred
to her; she derives no added benefit from the property she receives simply
because its value at the time of the exchange exceeds its basis to her
husband. While her marital rights constitute the basis of her bargaining
position in the settlement negotiations and ordinarily bear an approximate
relationship to the size of her husband's estate,S the specific property which
she actually receives is designated in the agreement between husband and
wife.9 Assuming that the wife's bargaining position enables her to command a certain dollar amount in the settlement negotiations, it is of no
concern to her whether she receives appreciated or depreciated property
in satisfaction of her husband's obligation. It would be purely coincidental
if the proportion of appreciation embodied in the property the wife in
fact receives were equivalent to the proportionate growth in her settlement share by reason of capital accretions to her husband's estate. Such
an analysis confirms the technical soundness of the established interpretation, followed by the principal case, that a transfer of appreciated property in a divorce settlement constitutes a realization of gain to the transferor
and is therefore a taxable event to him.10
Measurement of the husband's taxable gain from the transfer presented a more difficult problem in the principal case. Section IOOl(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 measures the amount realized from a
"sale or other disposition" as "the sum of any money received plus the
fair market value of the property (other than money) received." The
II "The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of
the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for
determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such
section for determining loss over the amount realized."
6 See 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.07 (2d ed. 1945).
7 Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217
(2d Cir. 1940).
s See l AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.18 (Casner ed. 1952): 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND
ANNULMENT § 14.42 (2d ed. 1961 rev.).
9 See Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943); 1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 13.31.
10 Commissioner v. Halliwell, supra note 9; Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986
(3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958); Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), afj'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950). Accord,
Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947); Rev. Rul. 57-507, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 511. Contra,
Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960);
Zimmers v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Ky. 1961). See also Rev. Rul. 59-47,
1959-1 CUM. BULL. 198; Rev. Rul. 57-506, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 65.
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Board of Tax Appeals, in early cases dealing with property settlements,
found it impossible to determine the fair market value11 of the property
received by the husband, i.e., the wife's released alimony, dower, and succession rights; it therefore declined to tax the husband. 12 The Courts of
Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits reversed these decisions and
assigned to the property received by the husband a value equivalent to
that of the property transferred by him. 13 This view prevailed14 until
the original holding of the Board of Tax Appeals was revived by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Marshman, 15
which was cited as controlling by the lower court in the principal case.16
The Marshman decision returned to an outmoded view of section IOOI(b)
that prohibited t~ation of capital gain at the time of the exchange if
no fair market value could be assigned directly to the property received.17
More recent cases, however, have presumed an equal exchange and have
assigned to the property received a value equivalent to that of the property transferred where the latter has a re?-dily ascertainable market value
and an "arm's-length" transaction is involved.18 Although most modern
decisions have viewed a divorce property settlement as an arm's-length
11 "[F]air market value means the price at which a willing buyer and a willing seller
would arrive, after negotiation for sale, where neither is acting under compulsion." In rt:
Estate of Williams, 256 F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1958).
12 Walter S. Halliwell, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941); L. W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940).
13 Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741
(1943); Commisioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695
(1942).
14 E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958); Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816
(1949), afj'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950). Accord, Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
15 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
16 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See Zimmers v. United
States, 199 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Ky. 1961).
17 See Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934); O'Meara v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1929). Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1919
encouraged reluctance to apply indirect valuation by providing that, in computing gain,
the value of the thing received should "be treated as the equivalent of cash to the
amount of its fair market value, if any." (Emphasis added.) Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1060. An
amendment in 1921 limited recognition of gain to instances where the property received
had a "readily realizable market value." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42
Stat. 230. In 1924 Congress formulated the realization of gain provision as it now
stands in § lOOl(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 256. Courts now acknowledge that the congressional intent is
to risk error in valuation rather than deny taxation entirely. See Helvering v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942); United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-l(a) (1957), reinforces this policy by providing that "only in rare
and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market value."
1s E.g., United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 843 (1961); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d !110 (2d
Cir. 1943); Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 166, 126
F. Supp. 184 (1954); E. Eugene King, 31 T.C. 108 (1958). The Marshman holding does
not necessarily repudiate this principle, since there was serious doubt as to the true
value of the property transferred by the husband. 279 F.2d at 33. Where subsequent
events will make certain the value of the property received, the imposition of tax
liability may be deferred. E.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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transaction unless the contrary is shown, 19 Marshman held that negotiations attended by the tensions that so often accompany marital discord
could not be so described.20 In the principal case the Court recognized
that a divorce settlement should be described, for tax purposes, as an
arm's-length transaction; the Court therefore repudiated Marshman and
valued the property received by the taxpayer as equivalent to the market
price of the securities transferred by him. This course was at least technically correct and should achieve certainty where previously there was
substantial doubt. 21 Moreover, it seems dear that the discharge of a settlement obligation does provide an excellent opportunity for many husbands
to realize the entire benefit of appreciation embodied in their property.
It may, therefore, seem inequitable as a matter of policy to allow such
a realization event to go entirely untaxed while granting no such privilege
to persons utilizing appreciated property for more conventional purposes.
Nevertheless, because of other, undesirable consequences, congressional
action altering the tax treatment of property settlements, as established
by the principal case, should be seriously considered. The most objectionable aspect of the present law is that it produces a highly unfortunate disparity of tax treatment between common-law and community-property
jurisdictions. While an equal division of community property goes untaxed,22 an equal division of the husband's property in a common-law
jurisdiction can produce a staggering tax liability. Congress has acted
on numerous occasions to eliminate such inequalities of tax treatment
arising from differences between the property law in common-law and
community-property jurisdictions,23 and should do so in this context.
Even within each property system the present Code produces unfortunate anomalies. The choice of husband and wife as to whether their
property is to be owned jointly or severally is often a matter of whim or
caprice; the accident of the form and incidents of their ownership may
be little indication of the way the parties view their rights. Yet, when
unexpected marital discord develops, the tax liability of the parties may
depend in large measure on the accident of title. Although no cases have
dealt with the point, most writers suggest that an equal division of property held by spouses in joint tenancy, like an equal division of community
10 See Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
741 (1943); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695
(1942); E. Eugene King, supra note 18; Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949),
aff'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950).
20 279 F.2d at 32.
21 The principal case has been cited as controlling by Robert K. Stephens, 38 T.C.
345 (1962).
22 E.g., Swanson v. Wiseman, CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.)
11 9264 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 1961); Ann Y. Oliver, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 347 (1949);
Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Transfers other than equal divisions are taxed
as in the principal case. E.g., Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. BIB (1949); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Jessie Lee
Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954). Accord, Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
23 Sec, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2(a), 2056(c), 2523(f).
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property, would be treated as a non-taxable event. 24 In contrast, an
equal division of property held in the husband's name alone could impose
a huge liability on him. Indeed, the present treatment of property settlements can pose an insoluble dilemma for a husband whose assets, for instance, consist largely of greatly-appreciated stock in a close corporation.
Transfer of such shares pursuant to a settlement agreement would give
rise to a massive tax liability while the husband would receive nothing
tangible-only the release of the wife's marital rights. Yet the husband
might well wish to avoid sale of his remaining shares for fear of losing his
voice in corporate matters. The harshness of the present law in this situation is compounded by the effect the impending tax liability may have
on the settlement negotiations, for the husband's situation may be so
desperate that the wife can extract inordinate concessions in return for any
action by her that would allow the husband to retain the control represented by his stock.2°
Finally, the present treatment of property settlements will inevitably
present administrative difficulties. In two older cases dealing with the
wife's basis for property received in a settlement the Tax Court accepted
a figure set by the parties as the amount of the obligation discharged by
the transfer of property, although the agreed figure was greater than the
fair market value of the property actually transferred.26 The converse of
this approach would allow parties to a settlement to shift part of the
husband's capital gain liability to the wife by setting the agreed obligation
at a figure below the fair market value of the property used to discharge
it. Since this result is fundamentally inconsistent with the rationale of
the principal case and presents an extraordinary opportunity for manipulation of tax liability, it is doubtful the Internal Revenue Service would
countenance it.27 Nevertheless, the difficulty involved demonstrates that
some aspects of the tax treatment of property settlements remain unsettled.
The tax liability of the wife presents special problems, for it is not entirely
clear, as a purely technical matter, why she should not be taxed on the
gain in the value of her dower interest when she exchanges it for property
from the husband in a divorce settlement. Taxation of the wife has been
avoided in non-divorce settings only by prohibiting the husband who
purchases release of his wife's dower interest from either adding the amount
of the payment to the basis of his property or deducting it as an expense
of defending or perfecting title. 28 Such difficulties demonstrate that the
24 See, e.g., CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ,I 4470.03; cf. Corfield v. Koehler, 207
F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962).
25 Just such a situation is described in Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1952).
26 Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), non-acq., 1950-1 CuM. BULL, 7,
aff'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM.
BULL. 2.
27 The Commissioner's non-acquiescence in Cristina de Bourbon Patino, supra note
26, should be noted.
28 Illinois Nat'l Bank v. United States, 273 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
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present Code is simply not properly designed to deal with exchanges involving marital rights.
The magnitude of these problems suggests that a divorce property
settlement is not an event appropriate for taxation of capital gain. The
similarity of property settlements to other transactions which Congress has
deemed inappropriate as taxable events reinforces this conclusion. As
with an exchange in kind of property held for use in a trade or business
or for investment,29 or a sale and purchase of principal residences, 30 the
transferor's gain in a settlement transfer does not take the form of property
that could be used to make tax payments.31 Likewise, divorce transfers often
share the characteristics of the involuntary conversions which Congress has
found inappropriate as taxable events.32
Congress could easily eliminate the harsh and inequitable effects of the
present law, as applied in the principal case, by enacting a relatively
simple nonrecognition provision.33 Such an amendment would provide
that the gain realized from the transfer of appreciated property pursuant
to a divorce or separation property settlement agreement would not be
recognized for tax purposes. A carryover provision would assign to the
transferee the transferor's basis for the property.34 An enactment of this
sort would require no change in existing gift and estate tax law as applied
to property settlements, for the operation of these chapters depends upon
the nature and timing of the settlement agreement, and not upon the
capital gain treatment of the property transferred. 35 It would of course
be necessary to limit operation of the nonrecognition provision to settlement agreements entered into after the enactment of the new provision.
Such a nonrecognition provision would merely postpone the payment of
tax on the appreciation involved; because of the basis carryover provision
363 U.S. 803 (1960):" O'Malley v. Yost, 186 F.2d 603, petition for rehearing denied, 189
F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1951); George M. LeCroy, 15 T.C. 143 (1950); Frank J. Digan, 35 B.T.A.
256 (1937). Contra, Frank v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1931).
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031.
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1034.
31 The Internal Revenue Service has followed the same course in declining to tax
the donor of a charitable contribution on appreciation embodied in the property he
contributes. Rev. Rul. 55-410, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 297. Accord, Campbell v. Prothro, 209
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
32 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033.
33 The American Law Institute, viewing property settlements as involuntary exchanges, has recommended such a provision. 1 ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § X257 (Feb.
1954 Draft).
34 Since property acquired under a settlement agreement is ordinarily not considered
a gift (see INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2516), the basis carryover provisions of § 1015(a)
would rarely apply, and a specific carryover provision would be necessary. Since the
possibilities of avoidance are negligible, the transferor's basis should carry over regardless
of whether it is greater or less than the fair market value at the time of the transfer.
Section 362(a) applies a similar provision to corporate reorganizations.
35 See Willan, Tax Aspects of Post-Death Marital Obligations, N.Y.U. 17TH INST.
ON FED. TAX 12ll (1959); Note, Federal Tax Consequences in Divorce and Separation,
7 UTAH L. R.Ev. 385 (1961).
20

30
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no forgiveness of tax liability would be involved. The principal case itself
recognizes that the problem is not one of whether the gain will be taxed,
but of when.
The principal benefit of such a nonrecognition provision would be
equalization of treatment between common-law and community-property
states. The relevant tax.able event would be the same in both cases-the
sale or disposition of the appreciated property to a party outside the
former marriage relationship. Equality would also be achieved within each
property system, for the location of title would have no tax significance at
the time of divorce. The parties could therefore distribute the property
involved in a more appropriate fashion, without regard to tax consequences which should properly be essentially extrinsic considerations.
The appropriateness of the tax.able event would also be greatly enhanced by such a postponement of recognition. Gain would be taxed only
on sale to an outsider, which in most cases would bring to the taxpayer
liquid proceeds to defray the resulting tax liability. The inevitable result
would be an amelioration of the weak bargaining position that the present
law may impose on the husband. While the wife could demand more in
the settlement negotiations because the tax liability would ultimately be
imposed on her, the husband could satisfy that demand with an additional
quantity of appreciated property; no tax would be due until further disposition of the property by the wife. Under the present law the tax must
be paid immediately and in cash; the sale of appreciated securities to
produce thiit cash only further multiplies the transferor's already sizable
tax burden. In situations where corporate control is involved the husband
could arrange for retention of voting rights of the stock transferred to
his wife; under the present law some of that stock might have to be sold
to outsiders to obtain cash with which to pay the tax.
Because divorce has become an extremely common phenomenon in
the United States-with one divorce occurring for every five marriages36 Congress should seek to assure equality of treatment for all taxpayers in
divorce circumstances. At the same time, however, Congress should insure
against the dominance of arbitrary and artificial tax considerations in
divorce negotiations. A nonrecognition provision eliminating the difficulties demonstrated by the principal case would go far toward attainment
of both of these goals.
Martin B. Dickinson, Jr., S.Ed.
86 Since 1950 the number of divorces in this country has averaged 375,000
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1962).

yearly.

